The investigation of two battles in the Hundred Years War by understanding the military culture and socio-political language of the Medieval Age

Note: I wrote this research paper for HIST 48R class (Warfare in the Middle Ages) by Dr. Georgios Theotokis in the last summer. I published a summary (or a preliminary) of this paper some months ago. 

There was a time when England and France were deeply at war: Hundred Years War (1337-1453)

Now I am happy to share my research paper with you. Enjoy reading! Do not hesitate to respond or to ask questions!

Introduction

   The Middle Age witnessed a variety of socio-cultural transformations and military novelties in Western European scale. There are also, on the other side, substantial continuations and similar attitudes in many socio-cultural elements and military concepts. As the Middle Age lasted, political climate also shifted and these multiple reasons prepared the ground for the Early Modern Age. In this era, the Hundred Years’ War is a prominent time to grasp the socio-political world and military culture of that age. This series of war between England and France lasted for 116 years as a result of the conflicts in hereditary rights to be the king of France and ended with a clear French victory which caused disorder in England with the Wars of Roses. Besides, that war contributed to new political, military, and socio-cultural developments in Western Europe. It must be remembered that there were a few battles in this long-lasting war. Both sides chose not to fight in battlefields in many cases due to the lack of economic and military power as well as the deficiency in finding enough soldiers for struggle. Nevertheless, there were sufficient instances that can help to understand the considerable properties of this war. Particularly, the campaigns of Crécy in 1346 and Agincourt in 1415 might demonstrate the fundamental characteristics of the socio-cultural world and military techniques of Western Europe in this epoch. For understanding those characteristics, it is necessary to examine writings between kings and chronicle records to understand propaganda’s role, campaigns and battles to get an idea with regard to the properties of military tactics and techniques, and attitudes towards slaves to take the culture of chivalric rules into account. In analyzing the route of Crécy and Agincourt, the increasing power of royal propaganda in politics, similar and different military tactics and techniques of both sides in battlefield for victory, the success of archers in infantry over cavalry, the rising usage of artillery weapons, new defensive mechanisms and different practices of chivalric rules in military culture can be observed. 

I-The Increasing Power of Royal Propaganda in Political Arena

   In the first place, making royal propaganda was quite crucial in the Middle Ages. This is because it “could be used to undermine their [enemies] subjects’ faith in their legitimacy”¹ in Allmand’s view. In the way of propaganda, kings could insert their rightness to their enemies’ subjects and get support for his cause. Especially, propaganda’s power augmented during the Hundred Years’ War and reached such a point that some authors claim it as a “revolution”. As Aberth points out

“at this time, what I call a revolution in the language of war…..It was a war of words”².

The war commenced with Edward III’s, the king of England, the claim of throne over France. This is because he was the son of former French king Charles IV’s sister Isabella. However, French nobility decided not to Edward but Charles IV’s cousin Philippe (VI) because the French tradition did not let have a female line for the throne. Nonetheless, Edward defied this after nine years by propagating that he was the rightful heir to the French kingdom. In numerous letters, he warned Philippe VI to surrender the crown of France. He said that his

“rightful inheritance of the Realm of France, which you have long time occupied with great wrong. And for that, we see well that you intend to preserve in your injurious withholding.”³

This did not work since, in his reply, Philippe VI rejects Edward’s claims by saying

“Our intent is…to chase you out of our realm for our honor… and for the profit of our people.”⁴

Hence, Edward III tried to convince French people by making his propaganda notably in churches by putting propaganda letters before beginning his campaign in 1346. By hearing this, Philipp ordered his officers to get active steps for eliminating propaganda. He wrote to the bailiff of Amiens that

“The king of England, mortal enemy to ourselves and our kingdom, scornfully using the most wicked deceit and malice, has caused to be written many letters…to important places…to turn the people against us…because…we…command you…whoever shall find any persons [who has letters]…take and arrest them and bring custody…and as soon as you shall have these letters, immediately cause them to be burned…”⁵

Philippe VI realized the political harm which was capable of shaking his position. In this respect, it can be remarked that chroniclers and clergymen also assisted Edward’s royal project in narrating Crécy. For instance, Froissart argued that Englishmen did not have such a brave and warlike king “since the time of good King Arthur.”⁶ Besides, he also exalted Edward III’s personality as a religious and devoted king at Crécy. According to the chronicler,

“he knelt before his altar, devout, praying God to grant…[later] took communion and most of their men also confessed and put themselves in a state of grace.”⁷

A letter which was sent to the archbishop of Canterbury also stressed this “divine” side. The letter portrayed Edward’s march to Crécy in a sacred context.

“He decided to land wherever God should give him grace to do so, and thus arrived well in good heart”⁸

Moreover, the depiction of Crécy was highly exaggerated to strengthen Edward III by many chroniclers. Chandos Herald sublimated Crécy among the entire fourteenth century’s battles in these words: so fierce a battle had never been since Christ’s coming…”⁹ The propaganda proceeded after Crécy in those productions. For example, an author described two kings in 391 lines shortly after Crécy. John Aberth indicates that

“Whereas “Philip Valois” is compared to sly and cruel animals such as…the fox, or the wolf, Edward is represented by the noble boar and leopard”¹⁰.

As Anne Curry contests, Edward also founded a chivalric society (the Order of the Carter) for the commemoration of his victory in 1346¹¹. Janina Ramirez found that Edward’s propaganda became not only a literary but also a spatial one. She asserts that on the sailing of a church in France,

“a shield hold by an angel for three crucial English leopards weapons depicted on it. No more than ornamentation, this standup furnishing was the 14^th-century propaganda and unmistakably English.”¹²

   When it comes to the Battle of Agincourt and Henry V, it could be underlined that many historians claim that Henry was more serious to insist upon his claim on the French throne in 1415. This is since, as Curry mentions,“Edward ostensibly gave up his claim to the throne”¹³ in the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360. For the same reason, Prestwich thinks that unlike Henry V,

“it is not clear whether he (Edward III) seriously hoped to become king of France, or whether he aimed to detach the Western provinces from the rest of the kingdom…”¹⁴.

Whereas Henry V needed to legitimize his rule even in England because he took the throne after disputes. Therefore, he frequently used propaganda more than Edward in warfare. Ramirez alleges that

“there is one way to prove his legitimacy. He…was going to the restore of Edward’s conquest and more than that: To prove God on his side and the side of English.”¹⁵

Although Edward and his chroniclers made religious propaganda, Henry V personally used religious emotions not only in praying but also in his speeches and letters. That is, he was determined to prove the validity and the divinity of his kingship.”¹⁶ Additionally, this extreme religious tone can be viewed from his letters sent to the king of France, Charles VI. “We assure you…heaven is our witness”¹⁷, he threatened Charles on April 7^th, 1415. Contrary to Edward III, who just signified God’s name in his letters to France, he usually told the stories of prophets and saints in almost every letter to Charles VI. His intention is actually to persuade Charles VI to abdicate the throne. For instance, he wrote that

“Christian blood, which produced so many wounds to Jesus Christ… If the prophet of prophets, the great Jeremiah, was now alive, what tears would he shed for the torrents of blood…we are fallen into the unhappy disposition of Lot and Abraham. To avoid a deluge of human blood, restore to us our inheritance which you unjustly hold.”¹⁸

However, Charles VI rejected that offer and the battle for the throne became inevitable. Propaganda went on after Agincourt under the celebration of Henry and his army. Allmand debates that in chronicles he “was seen as the Judas Maccabeus of his day”¹⁹. Maccabeus was a Jewish priest-leader who captured Jerusalem from the Seleucids. So, these resemblances also served to the representation of Henry as a pious ruler. The Liber, a book written after Agincourt, indicates that “Delight in the Lord, O Britannia, who provided this most noble prince and monarch of your kingdom.”²⁰. Allmand briefly summarizes the spirit of works in a sentence that “God had declared himself for the English and against the French.”²¹ In addition to this, Henry V ordered to commemorate the first anniversary of his victory at Agincourt in October 1416 and this tradition lasted for a long time²². Curry discusses that (Agincourt)

“this was for political rather than commemorative reasons…Henry should deliberately invoke the memory of Agincourt to encourage support…”²³.

This so well worked that Shakespeare echoed Agincourt at his play Henry V after nearly two century.

II-The Development of New Military Tactics and the Improvement of Different Weapons

   In addition to the weapon of propaganda, winning the battle had a huge significance in both armies. So, they used many different tactics and improved their military technology to win battles. In this regard, it is necessary to narrate how those battles happened with basic points to compare switches and similarities in time. The campaign of Crécy started with Edward’s arrival at Normandy. As Allmand emphasized, Crécy was an instance of chevauchées²⁴ since Edward’s army raided every place from Caen through Paris. By doing so, his main goal was “the undermining of the enemy king’s authority by challenging his military effectiveness.”²⁵ While Edward was trying to reach Somme, Philip devastated bridges along Somme to stop English offensive. Even though Edward’s army restored bridges, it was besieged by the French; therefore, the battle became inevitable. The battle occurred at the village of Crécy, south of Calais. Edward’s “3000 men-at-arms and 10.000 archers was brought to bay at Crecy by King Philip VI with 12,000 cavalries, 6000 Genoese crossbowmen and large numbers of levied spearmen.”²⁶ Though Edward’s army was smaller he was advantageous because he “drew up his force on a hill, with his rear protected by woods…”²⁷ On the flanks, he positioned archers and divided his force into three divisions. He also dismounted English men-at-arms and put some artillery on the battlefield. As for the French army, it was an undisciplined army under different commanders who looked down the British due to their numbers. As Oman detects,

“…a fiery and undisciplined aristocracy, which imagined itself to be the most efficient military force in the world, but was in reality little removed from an armed mob.”²⁸

Moreover, even though Philip ordered his nobles to wait until the next day, they did not listen and forward in the late afternoon since they “believed that they were to be deprived of the honour of opening the fight, as they could see that some of the troops in the rear were still advancing.”²⁹ Archery duel between the English and the Genoese determined the first phase. Froissart said that the Genoese

“The English archers took one pace forward and poured out their arrows on the Genoese so thickly and evenly that they fell like snow.”³⁰

Longbowmen’s technical superiority prevailed crossbowmen and after the Genoese retreat, the second phase began with French cavalry’s charge. Strickland underlines that on the flanks archers “can inflate and attack French horses” because of “this new tactical formation.”³¹ The first division of French cavalry retreated without order and crushed other divisions. After that, soldiers fell on the muddy soil since the weather was rainy. Ayton remarks that “men were killed by their horses” in turmoil. “It is a killing ground and it is created by the topography of the battlefield”³². French renewed charges did not work and “Philip VI, was himself wounded in the face by an arrow and was twice unhorsed”³³. When the war terminated, Philip VI and his army ran away. On the other hand, the campaign for Agincourt began with the conquest of Harfleur Castle in Normandy and Henry target not to raid but to capture areas along the way.

   However, Henry lost one-third of his soldiers as well as time and helped Charles VI’s army to rise.  Matthew Bennett indicates that

“Henry led about 1000 knights and men-at-arms, together with some 5000 archers. The French had at least three times that number, with perhaps 10.000 men-at-arms (fully equipped in plate armor), capable of being used as cavalry.”³⁴

The battle took place in the village of Azincourt, south of Calais. The English army’s organization was similar to what they did at Crécy as putting archers on the flanks and dividing the army into three divisions. Oman claims that Henry’s position was “excellent” because this “had a frontage of not more than twelve hundred yards, and was covered by woods on either flank.”³⁵ That natural barrier strengthened their protection in the plain and they also added stakes in front of their position to cease French charges. The battle commenced with English archers’ shooting against French cavalry. The intention of French was “to charge forward directly against the archers”³⁶ and beat them but Keegan indicates that “the cavalry failed to break the English line, suffered losses from the fire of the archers, and turned about.”³⁷ As a witness of Agincourt, Jean De Wavrin said that “the French themselves were so burdened with armor that they could hardly bear it nor move forward.”³⁸ Therefore, they became almost immobile and could not effectively use their weapons in Keegan’s view³⁹. In the wake of that, the second French charge also failed because of “the effectiveness of English arrows”⁴⁰ and “their horses fell upon the stakes”⁴¹. Rogers argues that the French “they advanced the second line prematurely; and they failed to make good use of either their crossbowmen or their third line.”⁴² As a last resort, some French troops assaulted the English baggage train to get royal treasures but Henry was worried and ordered to execute all taken prisoners. After the defeat, the French army retreated from the battlefield. Like Crécy, French-made mistakes to choose a disadvantageous location and to constitute an undisciplined army under inexperienced and over-confident noble structure⁴³.

   In both battles, the rise of archery as the main unit and artillery in conducting successful warfare could be seen for England. Before that war, Western armies preferred cavalry at the center and supported them with infantry. Besides, men-at-arms were the center of infantry. However, this system was replaced by the archery-centered military on the English side. There were various causes behind this transformation. Curry alleges that economic concerns determined to increase archery since it

“was a way of achieving a larger but cheaper army since archers were paid half as much as men-at-arms. This was important when funds were limited.”⁴⁴

Moreover, Aberth and Turner argue that the effective destructiveness of archery became the main reason for choosing at war. Turner contends that archers were “capable of blistering rates of fire and hitting enemies” because they were “able to loose up to eight arrows per minute and strike an enemy more than 200 metres away.”⁴⁵ This “meant more violence…[and] more the potential victims.”⁴⁶ in Aberth’s view. For this reason, Edward III ordered his sheriffs to bring hundreds of arrows for storing in the Tower of London before Crécy. For Edward

“For the sake of our expedition of war to France, we have immediate need of a great quantity of bows and arrows”⁴⁷

Matthew Strickland underlines that 3.000.000 arrows and 7.000 bows were used at Crécy⁴⁸. After witnessing its effectiveness at Crécy, Edward also ordered that everyone must

“practice with bows and arrows…so as to learn and exercise the art of archery. Forbidding, all and every one, on our behalf, to play…football”⁴⁹.

Otherwise, he threatened them of imprisonment. Prestwich notices that Henry V’s measures for arrows were impressive since he even forbid the use of wooden clogs and shoes and he “ordered to take six feathers from every single goose”⁵⁰.  Hence, archers were “more powerful than…during the conquests of Edward III”⁵¹ Against English longbowmen, French army employed crossbowmen but they were ineffective since although crossbow had a “relative ease of use, enabling crossbowmen to train in days rather than the years, its range less than that of the longbow.”⁵² In Ayton’s opinion, the crossbow was useful in defense but the longbows’ range, “its power of penetration…its rate of fire which was easily twice that of the crossbow.”⁵³ Curry explains why the French went on to use crossbowmen after Crécy is that because undisciplined French soldiers did not want much training. The Crossbow became a common weapon because it “required less training.”⁵⁴ Apart from infantry, the development of artillery may be traced in two encounters. Taylor Lewis makes clear that Edward III used unsophisticated weapons but they were not deployed in large quantities⁵⁵. Prestwich explains that at Crécy the English used cannon but “they were too few in number, and would have taken so long to load and fire that their role cannot have been decisive.”⁵⁶ These guns could not function at Calais in 1346 since this siege was “the longest and most expensive siege in Medieval History”⁵⁷. Technically, these guns were simple weapons but they “had developed into formidable siege weapons, capable of casting a large, heavy projectile a considerable distance.”⁵⁸ For example, Henry V used the most durable weapons in the English army until that time at the siege of Harfleur just before Agincourt in 1415⁵⁹. According to Rogers, this two-folded innovation is “a “military revolution” and each transition would be called as “Infantry” and “Artillery Revolution” since

“each of these transformations fundamentally altered the paradigm of war in Europe, with far-reaching consequences for the structures of social and political life”⁶⁰.

III-Different Paths for the Same Goal: Approaching Warfare and Chivalry in Two Sides

   Apart from these alterations, different aims of warfare in two campaigns could be observed. Initially, Edward III’s and Henry V’s approach to war with France were different. Curry claims that Henry’s intention was to conquest Normandy, unlike Edward who traced a mounted raid policy. For example, Edward sacked Caen and “moved on without installing a garrison”⁶¹ but Henry’s siege of Harfleur in 1415 is “a campaign of conquest, as is demonstrated by the support staff-gunners” and he had “troops to garrison captured places”⁶². Allmand and Ramirez also agree that difference and both claim that Henry’s way is “systematic conquest”⁶³ and “annexation”⁶⁴. Furthermore, military tactics significantly changed or improved and defense gained prominence. To illustrate, Jeremy Black states that strong defensive lines were often in Medieval England but “Henry V took the bold step of ordering his men to advance. This was contrary to all past English experience.”⁶⁵ After that; however, the English attacked the French lines even in the last battle in 1453. Furthermore, the usage of stakes for defensive goals is a crucial innovation of Agincourt. Before that, digging holes was common and Edward III ordered to dig holes against the cavalry at Crécy⁶⁶. How Henry learned to use stakes is credited to the Turkish effect because Turks used man-portable stakes at Nicopolis and they halted French cavalry charges⁶⁷. Stakes were also useful in places where dig defense was impossible⁶⁸. Against artillery’s effect, defense systems improved as a means of protection in cities. Allmand indicates that towns were important as “places of defense and refuge for the surrounding.”⁶⁹ He emphasizes that fortifications in many cities of France began just after Crécy. In one year, Philip immediately ordered the fortification of Reims, Caen, and Rouen. This factor hardened ultimate French defeat and war lasted longer for decades.

   The realization of idealistic chivalric codes like taking noble slaves in prison instead of massacring in two campaigns had differences. It should be indicated that chivalry and war had intimate relationships because merit, honour, or fame can be earned in campaigns by applying chivalric rules. That

“enabled the knight to hold his head high…and was complementary to lordship, inheritance, or manor house as signs of his position.”⁷⁰

Nonetheless, the implementation could be different at war. To illustrate, even though Edward implemented those codes, Henry cannot apply them at Agincourt. For instance, the Germans on Edward’s side requested not to kill nobility which was contrary to chivalry at Crécy and said:

“If you were to take them alive, you could thereby make great progress in your war, and would gain very great ransoms from them.”⁷¹

When victory was certain, the English began to take noble prisoners because their ransom would get them richer⁷². For Ayton, Crécy was important to obey chivalry since Edward needed to “vindicate his honour” and thus “the European aristocratic military elite could be turned” to his side; hence, the battle “could indeed be described as a ‘chivalric adventure”⁷³After Crécy, Henry captured Calais and desired to kill defenders but aristocrats told that “you are setting a bad example.”⁷⁴ Additionally, slave nobles said that “we six citizens of Calais… pray you by your generous heart to have mercy on us.”⁷⁵. Edward forgave in a chivalric way that

“they are gentlemen and I will trust them on their word.”⁷⁶

It can be noted that six nobles have been remembered since their status stands opposite the Houses of Parliament in London and Calais. Even the punishment of harming French nobles was 40 shillings⁷⁷. However, Henry ordered to kill nobles at Agincourt after an unexpected French charge from behind. Jean de Wavrin wrote that when he saw that attack, he wanted the prisoners’ slaughter but his soldiers “did not willingly do, for they intended to ransom them for great sums. But when the king heard this, he ordered a man and two hundred archers”⁷⁸ to kill prisoners. This non-chivalric treatment is debated among historians but they mostly defend Henry because of the war’s circumstances. Curry underlines that if the French attack was succeeded, “Henry could not afford to have his men distracted by their prisoners. The latter might attack their captors…therefore they had to be killed.”⁷⁹ Besides, she states that “even with the killing there was still a number of living captives.”⁸⁰ Interestingly, French narratives did not blame Henry for this act but self-criticism and the acceptance of military necessity were common in these works. Rogers considers it striking and stresses that “there is virtually no criticism of this action. Indeed…the primary texts, even the partisan French chronicles”⁸¹ did not charge Henry since he could

“justify even breaking the normal laws of war based on the recognized principle of “Necessitas non habet legem” (Necessity knows no law)”⁸²

For this reason, his action was not against the chivalric ethos but as a legitimate act to a harsh situation. Ultimately, Henry halted the killing when French assault was eliminated and therefore many nobles were put for ransom after Agincourt⁸³.

Conclusion

  On the whole, Campaigns of Crécy and Agincourt in the Hundred Years’ War can be considered as crucial milestones in terms of political, military, and cultural aspects. In this case, propaganda increasingly became a more effective tool for royal courts throughout the war. This legitimizing instrument was used not only kings, but also priests and chroniclers to glorify royal authority in a more political as Edward’s case or a more religious aura like Henry did. That propaganda’s vital role functioned in many levels such as writing letters, building projects, and commemorations. From the battlefields, it would be found the reasons why the English side could succeed in both battles although their disadvantageous number and equipment. In this respect, taking topography of battlefields into consideration, constituting a disciplined army which helped to manage decisions, implementing effective tactics and unites like putting stakes in front of units or using longbowmen against weaker crossbowmen might be the main causes of the English victories. Along with that point, as Rogers argues, revolutionary transformations occurred in the military like the soaring usage of archers as infantry and main units alongside the technical development of artillery. As Lewis explains,

“The age of the armored knight had essentially ended and…The war ushered in a new age of warfare.”⁸⁴

Fortification also became an indispensable part of towns as a way of protection against this more powerful weaponry. Though these campaigns had common characteristics like displaying important roles of archery and geography, there are considerable differences like the type of warfare as a raid in 1346 or conquest in 1415 and the implementation of the chivalric set of rules as the treatment of combatants showed.  Briefly, those two breaking points would help to illustrate the multi-dimensional aspects of warfare with changing and constant features.

Notes

1. Cristopher Allmand, Cambridge Medieval Textbooks: The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 55.
2. John Aberth, From the Brink of the Apocalypse: Confronting Famine, War, Plague, and Death in the Later Middle Ages, (Yale: Yale University Press, 2001): 61-63.
3. Cristopher Allmand, Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War, (Oliver & Boyd Press, 1973): 102.
4. Allmand, Society at War, 102.
5. Ibid., 149.
6. Jean Froissart, Chronicles, (London: The Penguin Books, 1978): 39.
7. Froissart, Chronicles, 83.
8. Richard Barber, The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, (London: Boydell Press, 1979): 14.
9. Barber, the Black Prince, 89.
10. Aberth, the Apocalypse, 72.
11. Anne Curry, Essential Histories: The Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002): 142.
12. Chivalry and Betrayal: The Hundred Years War, Documentary, DVD, directed by Janina Ramirez, (London: BBC, 2013).
13. Curry, The Hundred Years’ War, 142.
14. Michael Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1996): 202.
15. Chivalry and Betrayal: directed by Ramirez.
16. Chivalry and Betrayal: directed by Ramirez.
17. Sir Harris Nicholas, History of the Battle of Agincourt and of the Expedition of Henry the Fifth Into France in 1415, (London: 1833): 1.
18. Nicholas, the Expedition of Henry the Fifth, 4.
19. Allmand, England and France at War, 39.
20. Anne Curry, Great Battles: Agincourt, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 39.
21. Allmand, England and France at War, 39.
22. Anne Curry, Agincourt, 138.
23. Ibid., 52.
24. Allmand, England and France at War, 55.
25. Allmand, England and France at War, 55.
26. Kelly DeVries & G. Jestice. Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World, (Sterling Publishing, 2013): 45.
27. DeVries & Jestice, 45.
28. Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages. (London: Oxford University Press, 1885): 102.
29. Oman, the Art of War, 104.
30. Froissart, Chronicles, 88.
31. Chivalry and Betrayal: directed by Ramirez.
32. Chivalry and Betrayal: directed by Ramirez.
33. Chivalry and Betrayal: directed by Ramirez.
34. DeVries & Jestice, 48.
35. Oman, 109.
36. DeVries & Jestice, 49.
37. John Keegan, the Face of Battle, (London: The Penguin Books, 1976): 6.
38. Allmand, Society at War, 107.
39. Keegan, the Face of Battle, 6.
40. Allmand, Society at War, 108.
41. Allmand, Society at War, 109.
42. Clifford J. Rogers, “The Battle of Agincourt” in: The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas, edited by L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, (Leyden: Brill, 2008): 79.
43. DeVries & Jestice, 52.
44. Curry, the Hundred Years’ War, 12.
45. Graham Turner (ed.), “The Bow that build England”, History of War Annual: Volume 1. (Imagine Publishing: 2015): 23 & 26.
46. Aberth, 63.
47. Allmand, Society at War, 65.
48. Chivalry and Betrayal, directed by J. Ramirez.
49. Allmand, Society at War, 98.
50. Prestwhich, 141.
51. Graham Turner (ed.), “Great Battles: Agincourt”, History of War Annual: Volume 1. (Imagine Publishing, 2015): 35.
52. Turner (ed.), 27.
53. Andrew Ayton & Philip Priston, The Battle of Crecy, 1346. (Suffolk: the Boydell Press, 2005): 62.
54. Curry, the Hundred Years’ War, 24.
55. Taylor Lewis, “The Evolution of Military Systems during the Hundred Years War”, McNair Scholars Journal: Volume 19: Issue 1, (2015): 25.
56. Prestwich, 320.
57. Chivalry and Betrayal.
58. Prestwich, 292.
59. Prestwich, 292.
60. Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War”, Journal of Military History: Volume 57 (1993), 250.
61. Curry, Agincourt, 16.
62. Curry, Agincourt, 16.
63. Allmand, the Hundred Years’ War, 57.
64. Chivalry and Betrayal.
65. Jeremy Black, the Seventy Great Battles in History, (Thames & Hudson Press, 2005): 83.
66. Curry, Agincourt, 29.
67. DeVries & Jestice, 52.
68. Curry, Agincourt, 29.
69. Allmand, the Hundred Years’ War, 78.
70. Ibid., 42.
71. Rogers, the Battle of Agincourt, 100.
72. Rogers, the Battle of Agincourt, 101.
73. Ayton & Preston, Crecy , 4-6.
74. Froissart, 19.
75. Froissart, 108.
76. Ibid., 109
77. Barber, the Black Prince, 28.
78. Allmand, Society at War, 110.
79. Curry, Agincourt, 33.
80. Curry, Agincourt, 72.
81. Rogers, the Battle of Agincourt, 100.
82. Rogers, 102.
83. Ibid., 103.
84. Lewis, “the Evolution of Military Systems”, 25.

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